II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part

62. [To the first argument] - To the first argument [n.51] I say that ‘the Word is Incarnate’ does not state that the Word is the term of any action of the genus of action.

63. And when it is said that ‘the Incarnation has the Person of the Son as term’ [n.51] I say that that union (speaking of a union that introduces relation) introduces the Word as term, because in the human nature there is a real relation to the Word, and only a relation of reason on the other side. But a term of action of the genus of action is something that receives being through the action; but this is the real union of the human nature with the Word.

64. And if it is argued that “the Son of God is incarnate,     therefore he is the subject or term of the action, because ‘to be incarnated’ signifies an undergoing that one must indeed place in the subject or the term;” - and further, “to any action there responds its proper passive undergoing; the Three Persons were carrying out the Incarnation by action properly speaking; therefore what responds to it is passive undergoing properly speaking [Ord. III d.1 nn.74-83]; but this is ‘to be incarnate’, therefore etc     .”

65. Solution: to the first point I say that ‘to be incarnated’ is ‘to be united to flesh in unity of person’, and this according as ‘united’ states a relation of reason, not a real relation.

66. To the second point [n.64] I say that to the action of the Trinity there corresponds some real passive undergoing; but the object of it is the human nature and the term is something in the human nature, namely formal unity of that nature with the Word, so that the union of the Trinity, or rather the uniting, which is the action of the

Trinity, is for the union formally of the human nature with the Word, which union is really in the human nature.

67. And when it is said that ‘to be incarnate’ states a passive undergoing as ‘to incarnate’ states an action, I say that if ‘to be incarnate’ or ‘to be incarnated’ grammatically introduces passive undergoing because of the mode of signifying, yet not in reality in that of which it is said, but only in something else that connotes being united to it; and this other thing is said to be the subject of the undergoing really introduced by ‘to be incarnated’, which namely corresponds to the action that ‘to incarnate’ introduces.

68. [The second argument] - To the second argument [n.52] I say on the contrary that unchangeability, necessity, and infinity belong to anything that can be the term of some action of the genus of action properly speaking.

69. And when the actions of understanding and willing are spoken of [n.52], I say that this is not to the purpose, because (as was said in Ord. I d.3 n.501, Rep. IA d.3 nn.191-195) these are called actions because they are operations, for by actions of the genus of action some term receives ‘being simply’ (if it is produced), or ‘being in some way’; but through intellection the object understood in no way receives being; rather being is altogether presupposed to the intellection. And this is for the reason that these operations, which are called actions, are ultimate terms, and are not for the sake of other terms.

70. But there still remains the argument that action of the genus of action does not require the term to change.

I say that it does not seem easy how an action of the genus of action could be posited whereby the term does not receive being; rather, the way such action is posited in divine reality, the Son does receive being by active generation. But whether something could be the term of action or generation thus taken and yet in no way receive being will be stated in a section of the following question [nn.180, 189-190, 192-196].